Technological Revolution - A Myth? by Morris, Dave
n  TECHNOLOGICALI I f lV PMorris REVOLUTION 
- A  MYTH?
Challenging the view point of Radovan R ich ta  published  
in ALR No. 3 1967, Dave Morris expresses another opinion  
on the extent and po tentia l of scientific developm ent. The  
author, an engineer, was a victim  of the Petrov Commission 
smear, who later worked as a specialist in China, and lat­
terly in the Soviet Union. T he  editors invite  further dis­
cussion of these issues.
JU ST  W H A T  IS the “scientific and technological revolution”? 
In particular, are the views of R ichta re-published in Australian 
L eft Review  No. 3 of 1967 sound?
First, the au thor is a philosopher, and, as such, it is as well to 
look first at his conclusions. In  his last paragraph he says “In 
all probability it will take decades for the scientific and technical 
revolution to become the predom inant process in the areas where 
it does not encounter social obstacles.” So even in favorable areas 
it will still take decades before it becomes the “predom inant pro­
cess”, and, presum ably decades m ore after that before is seriously 
alters the actual structure  of existing industry decisively.
Second, I realise that both the Com m unist Party of the Soviet 
U nion and our own Party have, in their documents, accepted the 
existence of the scientific revolution as a fact, b u t it would be a 
bold man who claimed to evaluate it in terms of actual rates of 
Jmprovement in the people’s well being or in terms of food in 
the bellies of the hungry.
T hird , R ichta’s use of some statistics should be closely looked 
a t' For instance, he, like his colleagues, often talks of industrial 
productivity increases as if they were exclusively caused by "scien-
c' invention, research, and new technology. T he  tru th  is that 
the overwhelming proportion of all rises in productivity are due 
simply to economies of scale. These are well illustrated by the 
example from the Petroleum Gazette quoted by your correspondent. 
ln. the article “W icked W aste” in the No. 4 issue of A LR dealing 
With refineries and synthetic rubber plants. T o  double the physi­
o l  dimensions of a typical p lan t m ultiplies the area of all metal 
urfaces in the p lan t by four and raises the cost in  about the same 
atio. But it m ultiplies the volume of all working vessels and
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of the m aterials in process by eight, that is the capacity rises 
eight times for a four-fold increase in cost.
T his raises the fourth  point. If productivity is largely increased 
by economies of scale, what then is the real effect of autom ation 
cybernetics, atomic energy, nucleonics, computers and all the rest 
with which the various writers on technical subjects make such 
effective play? As regards “atomic energy and nucleonics” we 
may take it that it is almost a complete blue duck. In  spite of 
occasional m inisterial sunshine statements in the U nited Kingdom, 
there is very little chance of economic electrical power from u ran ­
ium  for many a long year, except in a few quite isolated localities 
far from all therm al fuel sources. W ith  most of the cost of 
research charged off to public account (always with the hope of 
side developments to bomb p rod uc tion ), atomic electric power has 
proved a complete economic disappointm ent over the 15 years or 
more of its development, even though ir, Britain rather dear coal 
and ru ling  class hatred of the miners provided powerful incentives 
for its use. But behind this situation is another key fact—that 
in industry as a whole power costs are less than two per cent of 
costs and all fuel costs less than four per cent. Only in special 
cases, such as electrochemical plants producing copper and alum ­
inium , are power costs in any way decisive, and in consumer 
goods industries such as food processing and textiles, power costs 
are infinitesimal. T he  idea that an age of cheap power in 
abundance will be an age of plenty for all is science fiction.
W hat then of cybernetics and computers? T here is no doubt 
whatever th a t there are very large savings of staff to be made in 
purely routine business activities, working out wages sheets, invoic­
ing, stock control card entries, ledger entries, etc. In  very big 
organisations such as banks, post offices, insurance companies and 
corporations, very big white collar staff savings are quite likely 
and possible and are already in progress. T o  what extent these 
will mean greater productivity handed on as benefits to the 
workers may be doubted, bu t at least some im provem ent in 
overall productivity is available as a source of eventual benefits. 
As for the direct applications to industry, such as process control, 
autom ated production or assembly lines, the results to date are 
trifling m ainly because they save labor in industries wherein labor 
costs are already very, very low indeed, such as oil refining, 
chemical processing, power generation, etc. But behind all this 
experience is another fact that is seldom recognised — nearly 
all o f the scientific revolution applies primarily to matters of 
control, not to production at all.
B ut economy is prim arily and generally and m ainly a m atter of 
production costs, no t costs of or im provem ents in control as such.
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I t  is indeed very fine to be able to steer an ocean liner on the 
“optim ised” most economical course, with all meteorological facts 
allowed for, bu t it really saves very little as com pared w ith the 
best judgm ent of an experienced navigator. N ot only so, bu t the 
com puter is itself an extra m aintenance commitment, and often a 
big one. Nowadays m aintenance costs of delicate control equip­
m ent are often com parable to operating costs of the p lant as a 
whole. Production costs depend m ainly on economy of materials, 
expense on storage, labor and scale of work to ensure overall 
economy. T his fact alone ensures that only very rare cybernetic 
trium phs have any appreciable effect on costs, a t least in industry. 
Stories about factories with 40 per cent engineers, 40 per cent 
technicians and 20 per cent skilled tradesmen are usually simply 
untrue. They may refer to the testing and finishing section of a 
rocket making and  assembly complex that may produce one or 
two rockets a year or som ething of that kind. But any pretence 
that, in any m ajor industry, the design trend is towards factories 
occupied only by button-pushers in white gowns nearly half of 
whom have diplomas or degrees, is simply false.
And what of the plastic "revolution”? Most of w hat is called 
plastic is, of course, synthetic rubber. T he total tonnage of all 
plastics m anufactured in the USA these days, after fifty years of 
development, is only a couple of m illion tons per year, as 
compared with one hundred  and twenty m illion tons of steel. In 
textiles plastics of various kinds run  to about 30 per cent by 
weight as an adulteran t, mostly, for m ixing with natural fibres, and 
the use of additive stabilisers to reduce deterioration on aging 
becomes ever m ore complex and troublesome. So m any “new” 
dvelopments are merely alternatives to existing materials, alter­
natives that kick a place for themselves by advertising campaigns 
and then give way partially  or entirely to some new fad.
.. A nother much advertised new m aterial once thought to  have an 
un lim ited” fu ture is alum inium , also now subject to considerable 
excesses of production capacity in the USA and the “older” economies.
. Interestingly enough alum inium  is being displaced in aviation, 
ln domestic equipm ent, and  in space technology by the even more 
expensive stainless steel. As a m aterial of general use in con­
struction alum inium  has failed entirely to establish itself, except 
Jn the rare m arginal cases when other m aterials are in short supply.
T u rn in g  now to R ich ta’s use of figures, his table on page 57 
Quoted from H ajek and Toms, claims to illustrate the increasing 
snare of “intensive” factors (technology, skill, organisation) in 
economic growth as contrasted with the share of “extensive” factors
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(the labor force and cap ita l) . T his pretends to separate the 
allegedly “scientific” factors— technology, skill and organisation— 
from  labor or “labor force” or, presumably, “labor power” in  the 
traditional m arxian sense.
It implies by definition what it seeks to prove, the presence of 
a new factor of grow th and therefore, presumably, of production, 
namely “science”, regarded and considered as existing, as a force 
in  its own right, independent of the m ain factor— the la ;orer, 
whether unskilled, skilled or technically trained. But science is 
inherently tied to and develops with industrial skills, it seldom leads 
them and usually serves to explain developm ent that has already 
occurred and to consolidate the rear of the advance, and to renew 
the advance in detail by developm ent of new materials specifically 
suited to particular conditions. T o  attem pt to separate “ tech­
nology, skill and organisation” from “labor force" borders on 
elitism and recalls B urnham ’s long dead “M anagerial R evolution”. 
T he  figures quoted are meaningless.
R ichta writes: “If at present the num ber engaged in scientific 
research in the USSR am ounts to 2.2 per cent of those engaged 
in the national economy (the percentage is 2.1 in the USA) while 
the share of those engaged in the education and service industries 
is 11 per cent, in the future the share of these groups will equal 
or perhaps even exceed the share of those engaged in industry.” T he 
figure of 11 per cent in the “education and service industries” 
apparently refers to the item norm ally prin ted  in Soviet statistical 
handbooks under the heading “Education, H ealth, Science, Scien­
tific services and Research”, while the latest figures for those 
engaged in industry—called “M anufacturing and C onstruction” are 
35 per cent of the work force in the USSR and 33 per cent in the 
USA. In  the USSR the proportion is growing steadily while it 
is very slowly falling in the USA. As everyone knows the recruits 
both for industry and the “service” industries come from agriculture 
and forestry, the percentage of the national workforce in which 
has fallen between 1958 and 1965 from 42 to 32 in the USSR and 
from 17 to 14 per cent in the USA. Indeed a large part of the 
national increases in productivity claimed by both  the socialist and 
capitalist economies, results simply from  the increasing mechanisa­
tion of their agriculture, bu t that is ano ther story.
W hy then should it be predicted that the num bers in “Education 
and. Service” will rise to above 30 per cent of the workforce? Of 
those in scientific research, at least eighty per cent in the USA are 
engaged on the “defence” and space programmes and some at 
least of the corresponding 2.2 per cent in the USSR m ust be so 
engaged. Is it really essential to assume a huge increase in  
these? T h e  health  service now dem ands about 4 to 5 per cent
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of the workforce. M ust sickness really increase un til it demands 
the aid of three times that percentage of the workers? Much the 
same applies to education, which will indeed, dem and a few more 
per cent of the workforce than at present, but scarcely an increase 
that would bring the totals of service workers to over th irty per 
cent of the whole, or that would cause the relative proportions to 
change places.
Another fact habitually overlooked by those who try to compare 
figures from bourgeois sources directly with the results of experience 
in the socialist countries is that there are huge categories of 
service or “tertiary” workers in the capitalist countries that either 
do not exist at all in the socialist countries or else exist only in quite 
infinitesimal num bers. Among such are the real estate workers, 
brokers, financial employees of every kind, debt collectors, and 
employees of such departm ents as governm ental supply, commerce 
and taxation, which scarcely exist in the socialist countries. Insur­
ance is another “industry" that demands huge staffs to sell and to 
adm inister every single individual policy, w hile vthe numbers 
engaged in wholesale and retail trade in such a country as the USA 
are more than three times the corresponding percentage of the 
workforce thus engaged in the USSR. Such facts as these make 
statements concerning the service industries in the tabulation 
at the bottom  of page 37 qu ite  futile. T o  suggest that at the “Onset 
of the Technological R evolution” (undefined), 20 to 35 per cent 
of the employed workers should be in the service industries in 
addition to 11 to 16 per cent in “T rad e”, is merely covering up 
the fantastic labor wastes inherent in an “advanced” capitalist economy.
Admittedly, some of the points m ade by R ichta show that he is 
well aware of the essential unity between researchers and techni­
cians as “an indivisible part of the working class” at least under 
socialist conditions (v. page 38). But his m isleading use of 
figures promotes social and political blunders such as a belief in 
an im m inent age of scientific wonders just around the corner, an 
age of enormous increases in productivity, increases so great that 
even the workers in  capitalist countries will be able to receive 
improvements in their well-being on an impressive scale.
M eanwhile in this scientific paradise only a tiny proportion of 
the scientist’s work is even remotely connected w ith direct produc­
tion in industry; m uch of it applies to communications, to controls, 
to inform ation storage, to energy production, to adm inistrative 
choices, to long term  corrosion prevention, to  “optim isation” of 
process regulation, and  sim ilar m atters not one of which affects 
the real overall costs of production ' by m ore than one or two 
per cent, either singly or in  com bination.
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M eanwhile many computers are used only for inform ation storage, 
their control capability sections standing idle, because the cost 
and trouble involved in program m ing them  properly is simply 
too great, unless, of course, they are used to control space vehicles 
or test missiles.
Most of the very, very few im provem ents which really do offer 
promise of significant cost eocnomies that may affect the living 
costs of the population slightly are due sir.iply to an extension 
of well known principles of design to new levels of application 
on an adequate scale. Such cases are the extended use of containers 
in transport, the use of tonnage oxygen in the smelting of steel, 
the new very large tankers, power generators, blast furnaces and 
rail wagons. N one of these involve any new scientific principles, 
and result from norm al engineering developm ent rather than 
“research”. R ichta speaks of the universal “im perative of grow th” 
which nowadays in  the West “determ ines the basic mass of practical 
solutions and practical questions (theory) of grow th.” As every 
socialist knows, the only thing about capitalist growth that is 
“im perative” is the political im perative to make a good showing 
in comparison w ith the far higher growth rates of the socialist 
countries. B ritain  and America are notorious for their low growth 
rates, and even the show window piece of the capitalist world, 
Japan , has of late suffered from heavy decreases in ou tpu t of key 
industries which even the Vietnam  war orders from the USA 
have done little  to relieve. W hen one deducts the natu ral rate 
of increase of population and the “n a tu ra l” rate of inflation 
of the currency from the money values of the apparent growth 
rates of gross national products in the m ajor capitalist economies 
the net growth rates begin to look puny indeed. Incidentally, 
many capitalisms which show m oderate growth rates also m aintain 
huge reserve armies of unem ployed over long periods of years, to 
help restrain demands for wage increases.
A nother po in t to be considered when evaluating the latest 
scientific developments is that in m any cases the new developm ent 
merely introduces a replacement of existing devices, that involves 
little  saving in  costs, and merely an  increase in convenience or 
im provem ent in appearance. Such a case is th a t of the transistor 
which merely replaces the therm ionic valve. T o  announce that 
the scientific developm ent of transistors has created a huge “new” 
industry w orth billions is quite a distortion of the facts. It has 
merely done so by destroying the m arket for the therm ionic valve, 
in the m ain, and has done noth ing to increase employment, 
economy, o r hum an well being, except in  a few rare non-typical 
instances. M uch the same applies to o ther “replacem ent” indus­
tries such as residual oil fuels or uran ium  replacing coal, various 
new household gadgets like clothes dryers and hair curlers, plastic
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paints and so on. B ut even when the benefits result they are 
often quite intangible, of no economic or social significance, or of 
trifling m agnitude except in terms of m inor convenience or 
(advertised) appearance of the ultim ate product.
Another factor of decisive im portance under present conditions 
is the continuous decay in the quality of the various parts of 
the national production pattern. Most of us have read of Park in­
son’s three laws of bureaucracy: 1—W ork expands to fill the time 
available for its com pletion; 2—Expenditure rises to m eet income; 
3—Growth means complexity, and complexity means decay. In  
most cases com puters obey rule one, in th a t no sooner does one 
give calculating staffs the chance to do far more calculations in a 
given time than ever before than they im m ediately invent the 
occasion to make the said calculations. T his applies especially to 
technical designers. W ith  them in particular, com putations expand 
to fill the com puter time available for their completion. Every 
national budget illustrates rule num ber two, b u t rule three is the 
one that most fully typifies the current trends of capitalist growth. 
Complexity is the leading feature of the eternally m ultip lying 
basket of semi-shoddy goods of the “mass consum ption” economies 
which are held in such veneration in the “affluent society”. Nearly 
all such goods can be replaced by the various services of the public 
utility networks in a socialist economy, which would elim inate 
whole industries m aking mass produced “consumers’ durables” 
that are now the hope of those who predict “h igh” grow th rates 
in bourgeois economies.
In  sum, the scientific revolution is certainly not another indus­
trial revolution  like that caused by steam and the factory system. 
Of its many widely different aspects only a few will have significant 
effects on the economy, including those computers that are used 
to displace large num bers of white collar routine clerical workers. 
O ther developments of significance are usually due to the norm al 
progress of scale economies and design, and have nothing to  do with 
any “scientific” innovation. T he  stories that large proportions of 
the workforce will become scientists an d /o r technologists are r id i­
culously overdrawn. T h e  reverse process is at work as well, though 
some moderate increase in  the proportion of trained m en is to 
be expected. In  particular, the scientific revolution will not, of 
itself, either give a new lease of life to the entrepreneurial economies 
or even of itself, greatly accelerate the growth of planned economies 
T here are no “push b u tto n ” factories in  m anufacturing industry, 
and even in processing plants the m aintenance workers increase 
as the operating labor costs decline. Above all else in  judging 
the social effects of any technical change we need discrim ination, 
and in the discussion of the practical effects of the new age of 
scientific wonders this is the precise quality that has thus far 
been conspicuously lacking.
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